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Abstract
The principle of ‘information causality’ can be used to derive an upper bound—
known as the ‘Tsirelson bound’—on the strength of quantum mechanical correlations,
and has been conjectured to be a foundational principle of nature. To date, however, it
has not been sufficiently motivated to play such a foundational role. The motivations
that have so far been given are, as I argue, either unsatisfactorily vague or appeal to
little if anything more than intuition. Thus in this paper I consider whether some way
might be found to successfully motivate the principle. And I propose that a compelling
way of so doing is to understand it as a generalisation of Einstein’s principle of the
mutually independent existence—the ‘being-thus’—of spatially distant things. In par-
ticular I first describe an argument, due to Demopoulos, to the effect that the so-called
‘no-signalling’ condition can be viewed as a generalisation of Einstein’s principle that
is appropriate for an irreducibly statistical theory such as quantum mechanics. I then
argue that a compelling way to motivate information causality is to in turn consider it
as a further generalisation of the Einsteinian principle that is appropriate for a theory
of communication. I describe, however, some important conceptual obstacles that must
yet be overcome if the project of establishing information causality as a foundational
principle of nature is to succeed.
1 Introduction
Answering the question of precisely what distinguishes our experience with quantum as op-
posed to classical physical phenomena has historically been a central element of the overall
∗This is the submitted version of an article published in the journal: Studies in History and Philoso-
phy of Modern Physics. There may be changes made in the published version which are not reflected in
this preprint. When citing this paper, please refer to the published version, which can be accessed via:
doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2018.05.001.
†I am indebted to the late William Demopoulos for sharing a draft of the chapter “Quantum Reality” with
me from his as of yet unpublished monograph On Theories. The present paper is motivated, illuminated, and
informed both by that chapter and by my conversations with Bill during the years 2013–2017. Thanks also to
Jeffrey Bub, Laura Felline, Sona Ghosh, Markus Müller, and Ryan Samaroo for their helpful and constructive
comments on a previous draft of this paper. And thanks to those in attendance for my presentations of this
paper at the University of Geneva and at the Workshop in Memory of William Demopoulos at the University of
Western Ontario in September 2017 for their helpful and constructive questions. This project was supported
financially by the Foundational Questions Institute (FQXi) and by the Rotman Institute of Philosophy. I hope
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project of interpreting quantum theory. For Schrödinger (1935), for instance, the sole distin-
guishing feature of quantum theory was none other than entanglement, while for Feynman
the one and only quantum mystery was self-interference (Feynman et al., 1964, vol. 3, 1-1).
The question continues to occupy many. However in much of the more recent literature it
has taken on a different form. That is, it has become one of specifying a set of appropri-
ately motivated constraints or ‘principles’ that serve to distinguish quantum from classical
theory. Clifton, Bub, & Halvorson (2003), for instance, prove a theorem which they argue
shows quantum mechanics to be essentially characterisable in terms of a small number of
information-theoretic constraints. Spekkens (2007), meanwhile, shows that features often
thought of as distinctively quantum can be manifested in a toy classical theory to which one
adds a principled restriction on the maximal obtainable knowledge of a system.1
One feature that quantum and classical theory have in common is that the correlations
manifested between the subsystems of a combined system satisfy the condition that the
marginal probabilities associated with local experiments on a subsystem are independent of
which particular experiments are performed on the other subsystems. It is a consequence
of this condition that it is impossible to use either a classically correlated or entangled
quantum system to signal faster than light. For this reason the condition is referred to
as the ‘no-signalling’ condition or principle, even though the condition is not a relativistic
constraint per se.
Quantum and classical theory do not exhaust the conceivable ways in which the world
could be. The world could be such that neither quantum nor classical theory are capable
of adequately describing the correlations between subsystems of combined systems. In
particular the world could be such that correlations stronger than quantum correlations are
possible within it. In a landmark paper, Popescu & Rohrlich (1994) asked the question
of whether all such correlations must violate the no-signalling condition. The surprising
answer to this question is no. As they showed, there do indeed exist conceivable correlations
between the subsystems of combined systems that are stronger than the strongest possible
quantum correlations—i.e. such that they exceed the so-called ‘Tsirelson bound’ (Cirel’son,
1980)—and yet non-signalling.
Popescu & Rohrlich’s result raises the question of whether some motivated principle or
principles can be given which would pick out quantum theory—or at least some restricted
subset of theories which includes quantum theory—from among the space of conceivable
non-signalling physical theories in which correlations at or above the Tsirelson bound occur.
This question has developed into an active research program. A particularly important
result emerging from it is that of Pawłowski et al. (2009), who show that one can in fact
derive the Tsirelson bound from a principle they call ‘information causality’, which they
describe as a generalisation of no-signalling applicable to experimental setups in which
the subsystems of a combined system (e.g. spatially separated labs) may be subluminally
communicating classical information with one another. Pawłowski et al. conjecture that
information causality may be a foundational principle of nature.
Below I will argue that, suitably interpreted (Bub, 2012), the principle can be regarded
as a useful and illuminating answer to the question of what the Tsirelson bound expresses
about correlations which exceed it. However I will argue that if one wishes to think of in-
formation causality as a fundamental principle of nature—in the sense that theories which
violate the principle should thereby be regarded as unphysical or in some other sense
impossible—then it requires more in the way of motivation than has hitherto been given.
1For a discussion of both Clifton et al.’s and Spekkens’ results, and of the project in general, see Myrvold
(2010); and see also Felline (2016).
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What has typically been appealed to previously to motivate the principle is the intuition
that a world in which information causality is not satisfied would be ‘too simple’ (Pawłowski
et al., 2009, p. 1101), or ‘too good to be true’ (Bub 2012, p. 180, Bub 2016, p. 187); that
it would allow one to “implausibly” access remote data (Pawłowski et al., 2009, ibid.), and
that “things like this should not happen” (Pawłowski & Scarani, 2016, p. 429). I will
argue below that these statements are unsatisfactorily vague. Nevertheless I will argue that
they gesture at something that is importantly right; although they are right in, perhaps, a
different sense than their authors envision.
More specifically, in contrast to Bub (2012), who in his otherwise illuminating analysis
of information causality argues that it is misleadingly characterised as a generalisation of
the no-signalling principle, I will argue that information causality can indeed be regarded
as generalising no-signalling in a sense. To clarify this sense I will draw on the work of
Demopoulos,2 who convincingly shows that no-signalling can itself be thought of as a gen-
eralisation, appropriate for an irreducibly statistical theory such as quantum mechanics, of
Einstein’s principle of the mutually independent existence of spatially distant things. Ein-
stein regarded this principle as necessary for the very possibility of ‘physical thought’, and
argued that it is violated by quantummechanics (Howard, 1985, p. 187). However, suitably
generalised and interpreted as a constraint on physical practice, Demopoulos convincingly
argues that Einstein’s principle is in that sense satisfied both in Newtonian mechanics (de-
spite its being an action-at-a-distance theory), and indeed (somewhat ironically3) that it is
satisfied in quantummechanics, wherein it is expressed by none other than the no-signalling
condition.
Coming back to information causality, I will then argue that it can likewise be thought of
as a further generalisation of Einstein’s principle that is appropriate for a theory of commu-
nication. As I will clarify, in the context of the experimental setups to which the principle
is applicable, a failure of information causality would imply an ambiguity in the way one
distinguishes conceptually between the systems belonging to a sender and a receiver of in-
formation. This ambiguity (arguably) makes communication theory as we know it in the
context of such setups impossible, similarly to the way in which the failure of the prin-
ciple of mutually independent existence (arguably) makes physical theory as we know it
impossible.
Before beginning let me emphasise that the general approach represented by the in-
vestigation into information causality is only one of a number of principle-theoretic ap-
proaches that one can take regarding the question of how to distinguish quantum from
super-quantum theories. In the kind of approach exemplified by the investigation into in-
formation causality, one focuses on sets of static correlation tables associated with quan-
tum and super-quantum theories, and in particular one disregards the dynamics of (super-
)quantum systems. There is another family of principle-theoretic approaches to the ques-
tion, however, wherein a richer framework is considered that does include dynamics.4
Popescu & Rohrlich’s seminal (1994) investigation is an example of the former type of
approach, though they themselves consider the latter, dynamical, approach to have the
potential for deeper insight. For my part I do not consider any particular approach to be su-
perior. Principle-theoretic approaches to the characterisation of quantum theory augment
2I am referring to the chapter “Quantum Reality” of Demopoulos’s monograph On Theories, which is cur-
rently being prepared for posthumous publication.
3Demopoulos’s ‘judo-like’ argumentative manoeuvre is reminiscent of Bell’s (cf. Shimony, 1984, p. 41).
4For further references, as well as an accessible description of one of these reconstructions of quantum
theory, see Koberinski & Müller (2018).
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our understanding of the world by illuminating various aspects of it to us. Which particu-
lar aspect of the world is illuminated by an investigation will depend upon the particular
question—and the framework which defines it—that is asked.5 I am highly skeptical of the
idea that any one framework is sufficient by itself to illuminate all. Rather, these different
frameworks of analysis should be seen as conveying to us information—in general neither
literal nor complete—regarding different aspects of one and the same reality.
The rest of this paper will proceed as follows: I will introduce Popescu-Rohrlich (PR)
correlations in §2. In §3 I will introduce the ‘guessing game’ by which the principle of infor-
mation causality is standardly operationally defined. The principle of information causality
itself will be introduced in §4, wherein I will also describe how it can be used to derive the
Tsirelson bound. I will argue in that section that information causality has not been suffi-
ciently motivated to play the role of a foundational principle of nature, and in the remainder
of the paper I will consider how one might begin to provide it with such a motivation. This
analysis begins in §5 where I describe an argument, due to Demopoulos, to the effect that
the no-signalling condition can be viewed as a generalisation, appropriate to an irreducibly
statistical theory, of Einstein’s principle of mutually independent existence interpreted as a
constraint on physical practice. Then in §6 I argue that a promising route toward success-
fully motivating information causality is to in turn consider it as a further generalisation of
no-signalling that is appropriate to a theory of communication. I describe, however, some
important obstacles that must yet be overcome if the project of establishing information
causality as a foundational principle of nature is to succeed.
2 Popescu-Rohrlich correlations
Consider a correlated state σ of two two-level subsystems.6 Let Alice and Bob each be
given one of the subsystems, and instruct them to travel to distinct distant locations. Let
p(A,B|a, b) be the probability that Alice and Bob obtain outcomes A and B, respectively,
after measuring their local subsystems with the respective settings a and b. If A,B ∈ {±1},
the expectation value of the outcome of their combined measurement is given by:
〈a, b〉 =
∑
i, j∈{1,−1}
(i · j) · p(i, j|a, b),
where A= i and B = j. Less concisely, this is:
〈a, b〉 = 1 · p(1,1|a, b)− 1 · p(1, -1|a, b)− 1 · p(-1, 1|a, b) + 1 · p(-1, -1|a, b)
= p(same|a, b)− p(different|a, b).
Since p(same|a, b) + p(different|a, b) = 1, it follows that 〈a, b〉 + 2 · p(different|a, b) = 1,
so that:
p(different|a, b) = 1− 〈a, b〉
2
.
Similarly, we have that
p(same|a, b) = 1+ 〈a, b〉
2
.
5Thanks to Giulio Chiribella for expressing something like this statement in answer to a question posed
to him at the workshop ‘Contextuality: Conceptual Issues, Operational Signatures, and Applications’, held at
the Perimeter Institute in July, 2017.
6Elements of the exposition in this and the next section have been adapted from Bub (2012, 2016) and
Pawłowski et al. (2009).
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Now imagine that σ is such that the probabilities for the results of experiments with
settings a, b, a′, b′, where a′ and b′ are different from a and b but arbitrary (Popescu &
Rohrlich, 1994, p. 382), are:
p(1,1|a, b) = p(-1, -1|a, b) = 1/2,
p(1,1|a, b′) = p(-1, -1|a, b′) = 1/2,
p(1,1|a′, b) = p(-1, -1|a′, b) = 1/2,
p(1, -1|a′, b′) = p(-1, 1|a′, b′) = 1/2. (2.1)
In other words, if at least one of their settings is one of a or b, then Alice’s and Bob’s results
are guaranteed to be the same. Otherwise they are guaranteed to be different. These
correlations are called ‘PR’ correlations after Popescu & Rohrlich (1994).
Alice’s marginal probability p(1A|a, b) of obtaining the outcome 1 given that she mea-
sures a and Bob measures b is defined as: p(1A, 1B|a, b) + p(1A, -1B|a, b). The no-signalling
condition requires that her marginal probability of obtaining 1 is the same irrespective of
whether Bob measures b or b′, i.e. that p(1A|a, b) = p(1A|a, b′), in which case we can write
her marginal probability simply as p(1A|a). In general, no-signalling requires that
p(A|a, b) = p(A|a, b′), p(A|a′, b) = p(A|a′, b′),
p(B|a, b) = p(B|a′, b), p(B|a, b′) = p(B|a′, b′). (2.2)
The reader can verify that the PR correlations (2.1) satisfy the no-signalling condition (2.2).
If we imagine trying to simulate the PR correlations (2.1) with some bipartite general
non-signalling system η, then the probability of a successful simulation (assuming a uniform
probability distribution over the possible joint measurements (a, b), (a, b′), (a′, b), and
(a′, b′)) is given by:7
1
4
 
p(same|a, b) + p(same|a, b′) + p(same|a′, b) + p(different|a′, b′)

=
1
4

1+ 〈a, b〉
2
+
1+ 〈a, b′〉
2
+
1+ 〈a′, b〉
2
+
1− 〈a′, b′〉
2

=
1
2

1+
〈a, b〉+ 〈a, b′〉+ 〈a′, b〉 − 〈a′, b′〉
4

.
Notice that 〈a, b〉+〈a, b′〉+〈a′, b〉−〈a′, b′〉 is just the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH)
correlation expression (Clauser et al., 1969). So the probability of a successful simulation
of the PR correlations by η is:
p(successful sim) =
1
2

1+
CHSH
4

, (2.3)
with CHSH = 4 if η is itself a PR-system.8 As is well known, classically correlated systems
are bounded by |CHSH| ≤ 2. Thus the optimum probability of simulating PR correlations
with a bipartite classical system is given by 1/2(1 + 2/4) = 3/4. Quantum correlations are
bounded by |CHSH| ≤ 2p2.
7By a ‘successful simulation’ I mean a single joint measurement in which Alice and Bob get opposite
outcomes—(1,-1) or (-1,1)—if their settings are (a′, b′), or the same outcome—(1,1) or (-1,-1)—otherwise.
8The reader may be familiar with the use of the term ‘PR-box’ to refer to systems whose subsystems are
correlated as in (2.1). I find the term ‘box’ to be misleading since it conveys the idea of a spatially contiguous
region occupied by a combined system. Bub’s (2016) banana imagery is far less misleading in this sense.
Below I will not use figurative language at all, but will (boringly) refer merely to such entities as ‘PR-systems’,
‘PR-correlated systems’, and so on.
5
3 Alice and Bob play a guessing game
At this point it will be convenient to change our notation. From now on I will refer to the
measurement settings a and a′ as 0 and 1, respectively, and likewise for b and b′. The
outcomes 1 and -1 will also be respectively relabelled as 0 and 1. This will allow us to
describe PR correlations more abstractly using the exclusive-or (alternately: modulo two
addition) operator as follows:
M1 ⊕M2 = m1 ·m2 (3.1)
where capital letters refer to measurement outcomes and small letters to measurement
settings. To illustrate, for a given 01-experiment (formerly (a, b′)) there are two possible
outcomes: 00 and 11 (formerly: (1,1) and (-1,-1)), and we have: 0⊕0 = 0·1 and 1⊕1 = 0·1,
respectively.
Now imagine the following game. At the start of each round of the game, Alice and
Bob receive random and independently generated bit strings a = aN−1, aN−2, . . . , a0 and
b = bn−1, bn−2, . . . , b0, respectively, with N = 2
n. They win a round if Bob is able to
guess the value of the bth bit in Alice’s list. For example, suppose Alice receives the string
a7a6a5a4a3a2a1a0, and Bob receives the string 110. Then Bob must guess the value of a6.
They win the game if Bob is able to guess correctly over any sequence of rounds.
Besides this the rules of the game are as follows. Before the game starts, Alice and
Bob are allowed to determine a mutual strategy and to prepare and share non-signalling
physical resources such as classically correlated systems, or quantum systems in entangled
states, or PR-systems, or other (bipartite) systems manifesting non-signalling correlations.
They then go off to distinct distant locations, taking with them their portions of whatever
systems were previously prepared. Once separated, Alice receives her bit string a and Bob
his bit string b. She is then allowed to send Bob one additional classical bit c, upon receipt
of which Bob must guess the value of Alice’s bth bit.
Alice and Bob can be certain to win the game if they share a number of PR-systems. I
will illustrate the case of N = 4, which requires three PR-systems (per round) labelled I,
II, and III. Upon receiving the bit string a = a3a2a1a0, Alice measures a0 ⊕ a1 on her part
of system I and gets the result AI . She then measures a2 ⊕ a3 on her part of system II and
gets the outcome AI I . She then measures (ao⊕AI)⊕ (a2⊕AI I) on her part of system III and
gets the result AI I I . She finally sends c = a0 ⊕ AI ⊕ AI I I to Bob. Meanwhile, Bob, who has
previously received b = b1b0, measures b0 on his parts of systems I and II, and gets back
the results BI and BI I . He also measures b1 on system III with the result BI I I .
Bob’s next step depends on the value of b, i.e. on which of Alice’s bits he has to guess.
When b = b1b0 = 00 (i.e. when Bob must guess the 0
th bit) or b = b1b0 = 01 (i.e. when
Bob must guess the 1st bit) his guess should be:
c ⊕ BI I I ⊕ BI = a0 ⊕ AI ⊕ AI I I ⊕ BI I I ⊕ BI . (3.2)
For since AI I I ⊕ BI I I =
 
(a0 ⊕ AI)⊕ (a2 ⊕ AI I)

· b1, we have:
a0 ⊕AI ⊕ AI I I ⊕ BI I I ⊕ BI
= a0 ⊕AI ⊕ b1(a0 ⊕ AI)⊕ b1(a2 ⊕ AI I)⊕ BI
= a0 ⊕AI ⊕ BI
= a0 ⊕ b0(a0 ⊕ a1). (3.3)
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If b = 00 then (3.3) correctly yields a0. If b = 01 then (3.3) correctly yields a1.
Suppose instead that b = 10 or b= 11. In this case, Bob’s guess should be
c ⊕ BI I I ⊕ BI I = a0 ⊕ AI ⊕ AI I I ⊕ BI I I ⊕ BI I . (3.4)
This is
= a0 ⊕ AI ⊕ b1(a0 ⊕ AI)⊕ b1(a2 ⊕ AI I)⊕ BI I
= (a0 ⊕AI)⊕ (a0 ⊕ AI)⊕ (a2 ⊕ AI I)⊕ BI I
= a2 ⊕ AI I ⊕ BI I
= a2 ⊕ b0(a2 ⊕ a3). (3.5)
If b = 11 then (3.5) correctly yields a3. If b = 10 then (3.5) correctly yields a2.
In general, given N − 1 PR-correlated systems per round,9 and a single classical bit per
round communicated by Alice to Bob, Alice and Bob can be certain to win the game for any
value of N . In other words, given these resources and a single classical bit communicated
to him by Alice, Bob can access the value of any single bit from her data set, however large
that data set is. This result further generalises to the case where Alice is allowed to send
not just one but m bits cm−1 . . . c0 to Bob in a given round, and Bob is required to guess
an arbitrary set of m bits from Alice’s data set. Note that if Alice is not allowed to send
anything to Bob, i.e., when m = 0, then Bob will not be able to access the values of any of
Alice’s bits irrespective of how many PR-systems they share. This is a consequence of the
fact that PR-correlations satisfy the no-signalling principle (2.2).
4 Information causality and the Tsirelson bound
As we saw in the last section, Alice and Bob can be certain to win the guessing game de-
scribed there if they share a number of PR-correlated systems prior to going off to their
respective locations. Note that if they do not use any correlated resources, they can still be
sure to win the occasional round if Alice always sends Bob the value of whatever bit is at a
previously agreed-upon fixed position ak in her list. In this case, Bob will be guaranteed to
guess correctly whenever b singles out k (but only then; otherwise he must rely on blind
luck). If Alice and Bob share a sequence of classically correlated random bits, on the other
hand, then Bob will be able to access the value of a single in general different ai in Alice’s
list on each round.
Now consider the case where Alice and Bob share general no-signalling systems, i.e. bi-
partite systems such that the correlations between their subsystems satisfy the no-signalling
condition. Recall that the probability that a non-signalling system simulates a PR-system
on a given run depends on the value of CHSH in (2.3) that is associated with it. For conve-
nience we will define E =df CHSH/4 so that (2.3) becomes:
p(successful sim) =
1
2
(1+ E). (4.1)
9These are to be arranged in an inverted pyramid so that the results of Alice’s (respectively, Bob’s) local
measurements on the first 2n−1 PR-systems are used to determine the local settings for her (his) next 2n−2
measurements, and so on, for (n − i) ≥ 0. Note that the cost in the number of PR-systems needed scales
exponentially with respect to the length of b. I will return to this point later.
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When E = 1 for a given non-signalling system, then it just is a PR-system, and the probability
of a successful simulation is 1. When E < 1, then for given settings m1,m2, the values of the
outcomes M1,M2, will in general not satisfy the relation (3.1), i.e. M1⊕M2 will not always
equal m1 ·m2. For a given attempted simulation, let us say that M2 is ‘correct’ whenever
(3.1) holds, and ‘incorrect’ otherwise.10
Recall that in the N = 4 game above, at the end of each round, Bob guesses either (i)
c ⊕ BI I I ⊕ BI , or (ii) c ⊕ BI I I ⊕ BI I , depending on the value of b. We will consider only case
(i), as the analysis is similar for (ii). If both BI and BI I I are ‘correct’, then for that particular
round, the non-signalling systems will have yielded the same guess for Bob as PR-systems
would have yielded:
(c ⊕ BI I I ⊕ BI)NS = (c ⊕ BI I I ⊕ BI)PR. (4.2)
Note that if both BI and BI I I are incorrect, (4.2) will still hold, since in general x1 ⊕ x2 =
x1 ⊕ x2. So either way Bob will guess right. The probability of an unsuccessful simulation
is
1− 1
2
(1+ E) =
1
2
(1− E).
Thus the probability that Bob makes the right guess on a given round in the N = 4 game is:

1
2
(1+ E)
2
+

1
2
(1− E)
2
=
1
2
(1+ E2).
In the general case, for N = 2n, one can show (Pawłowski et al., 2009; Bub, 2012, 2016)
that the probability that Bob correctly guesses Alice’s bth bit is
pb =
1
2
(1+ En). (4.3)
The binary entropy h(pb) associated with pb is given by
h(pb) = -pb log2 pb − (1− pb) log2 (1− pb).
In the case where Bob has no information about Alice’s bth bit, pb = 1/2 and h(pb) = 1. If
Alice then sends Bob m bits, then in general Bob’s information about that bit will increase
by some non-zero amount. Pawłowski et al. (2009) propose the following constraint on
this quantity, which they call the ‘information causality’ principle:
The information gain that Bob can reach about a previously unknown to him
data set of Alice, by using all his local resources and m classical bits communi-
cated by Alice, is at most m bits (2009, p. 1101).
For example, assuming that the N = 2n bits in Alice’s bit string a are unbiased and inde-
pendently distributed, then if Alice sends Bob a single bit (i.e. when m = 1), information
causality asserts that Bob’s information about the bth bit in Alice’s string may increase by
no more than 1/2n, i.e.,
h(pb)≥ 1−
1
2n
. (4.4)
10There is of course no reason why we should not say that M1 rather than M2 is incorrect, but for the
analysis that follows it is convenient to take Bob’s point of view.
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As Pawłowski et al. (2009) show, the principle is satisfied within quantum mechanics. But
within any theory which permits correlations with a value of E exceeding 1/
p
2 (i.e. any
theory which allows correlations above the Tsirelson bound), one can find an n such that
for a given m the principle is violated (for example, let E = .72, m = 1, and n = 10).11,12
Given that any correlations above the Tsirelson bound will demonstrably violate the
principle in this sense, it is tempting to view information causality as the answer to the
question (i) of why nature does not allow correlations above this bound. And since the
Tsirelson bound represents the maximum value of the CHSH expression for quantum corre-
lations, one is further tempted to view information causality as the answer to the question
(ii) of why only quantum correlations are allowable in nature. Indeed, Pawłowski et al.
suggest that information causality “might be one of the foundational properties of nature”
(2009, p. 1101).
There is a subtlety here, however. The set of quantum correlations forms a convex
set which can be represented as a multi-dimensional region of points such that the points
within this region that are furthest from the centre are at the Tsirelson bound (Bub, 2016,
§5.1). Information causality disallows correlations beyond this bound, as we saw. It also
disallows some correlations below the bound that are outside of the quantum convex set
(for a discussion, see Pawłowski & Scarani, 2016). However there is numerical evidence
that there exist correlations within the bound but outside of the quantum convex set that
satisfy the information causality principle (Navascués et al., 2015). So it appears unlikely
(though this was not known in 2009) that information causality can provide an answer
to question (ii). It nevertheless remains promising as a principle with which to answer
question (i) and can arguably still be thought of as a fundamental principle in that sense.
Analogously, the fact that super-quantum no-signalling correlations are possible does not,
in itself, undermine the status of no-signalling as a fundamental principle.
The information causality principle must be given some independent motivation if it is
to play this explanatory role, however. For even a conventionalist would agree that some
stipulations are better than others (DiSalle, 2002). Thus some independent reason should
be given for why one might be inclined to accept the principle. Of course, the statement
that the communication of m bits can yield no more than m bits of additional information
to a receiver about a data set unknown to him is an intuitive one. But foundational princi-
ples of nature should require more for their motivation than such bare appeals to intuition.
After all, quantum mechanics, which the principle aims to legitimate, arguably already vio-
lates many of our most basic intuitions. Pawłowski et al. (2009) unfortunately do not say
very much to motivate information causality. But two ideas can be gleaned from statements
made in their paper. The first is that in a world in which violations of information causal-
ity could occur, “certain tasks [would be] ‘too simple”’ (p. 1101). The second is that in
such a world there would be “implausible accessibility of remote data” (ibid.). The former
idea has been expressed in this general context before. Van Dam (2013 [2005]), notably,
11Note that when E = 1 the principle is always violated for any m and n.
12I have followed Bub in expressing information causality as a constraint on binary entropy, as conceptually
this is a more transparent way of expressing Pawłowski et al.’s ‘qualitative’ statement of the principle in terms
of concrete information-theoretic quantities. While Pawłowski et al. also relate information causality to the
binary entropy (2009, p. 1102 and Supplementary Information §III), their general results (that information
causality is satisfied within quantum mechanics and that it is violated within any theory which allows correla-
tions above the Tsirelson bound) begin with the formulation of information causality as a condition on mutual
information rather than binary entropy. For our purposes it is immaterial which formulation one chooses; in
particular, Bub (2012, §§11.4–11.5) has shown that (4.4) is entailed by Pawłowski et al.’s formulation and
moreover proves that (4.4) is satisfied when E = 1p
2
.
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shows that in a world in which PR-correlations exist and can be taken advantage of, only
a trivial amount of communication (i.e. a single bit) is required to perform any distributed
computational task. Van Dam argues (ibid., p. 12) that this is a reason to believe that
such correlations cannot exist, for they violate the principle that “Nature does not allow a
computational ‘free lunch”’ (ibid., p. 9).13 Bub (2012, pp. 180-181) echoes this thought
by listing examples of distributed tasks (‘the dating game’ and ‘one-out-of-two’ oblivious
transfer) which would become implausibly trivial if PR-correlated systems could be used.
Later in this paper I will argue that although such statements are unsatisfactorily vague,
they nevertheless get at something that is importantly right; although they are right in,
perhaps, a different sense than their authors envision. For now let me just say that even
if one accepts van Dam’s argument that pervasive trivial communication complexity is im-
plausible and should be ruled out—and that this should constitute a constraint on physical
theory—not all correlations above the Tsirelson bound in fact result in the trivialisation of
communication complexity theory.14 Brassard et al. (2006) have extended van Dam’s result
by showing that (probabilistic) pervasive trivial communication complexity can be achieved
for values of E >
p
6/3. But this still leaves a range of values for E open; physical correla-
tions with associated values of E between the quantum mechanical maximum of 1/
p
2 andp
6/3 have not been shown to result in pervasive trivial communication complexity and
cannot—at least not yet—be ruled out on those grounds. Thus the avoidance of pervasive
trivial communication complexity cannot be used to motivate information causality in the
way suggested by the statements of Pawłowski et al. (2009). In fairness, to say as they do
that certain tasks would be ‘too simple’ in a world in which information causality is violated
is not the same as saying that they would be trivial. The task remains, then, of expressing
more precisely what is meant by ‘too simple’ in a way that is sufficient to motivate ruling
out theories which violate the information causality principle in a less than maximal way
(in particular with a value of E ≤p6/3). We will return to this point later.
Regarding their second idea—that a world in which information causality is violated
would manifest “implausible accessibility of remote data” (p. 1101)—Pawłowski et al.
(2009) again do not say enough,15 although the idea is perhaps alluded to implicitly in
another assertion they (too briefly) make, namely that information causality generalises
the no-signalling principle (ibid., p. 1103). We will come back to this point later. In any
case, the idea of implausible accessibility is fortunately expanded upon by Bub (2012), who
motivates it in the following way:
when the bits of Alice’s data set are unbiased and independently distributed,
the intuition is that if the correlations can be exploited to distribute one bit
of communicated information among the N unknown bits in Alice’s data set,
the amount of information distributed should be no more than 1
N
bits, because
there can be no information about the bits in Alice’s data set in the previously
established correlations themselves (p. 180).
13Cf. Aaronson (2005).
14Communication complexity theory aims to quantify the communicational resources—measured in trans-
mitted bits—required to solve various distributed computational problems. A good reference work is that of
Hushilevitz & Nisan (1997).
15Pawłowski & Scarani (2016, p. 429) do expand on the idea of implausible accessibility slightly: “we have
transmitted only a single bit and the PR-boxes are supposed to be no-signalling so they cannot be used to
transmit the other. Somehow the amount of information that the lab of Bob has is larger than the amount
it received. Things like this should not happen.” I do not think this adds anything substantial to the idea
expressed by Pawłowski et al. (2009) that such a situation is ‘implausible’.
10
Partly for this reason, Bub argues that the principle is misnamed. Drawing on the idea of
implausible accessibility he argues that ‘information causality’ should rather be referred to
as information neutrality: “The principle really has nothing to do with causality and is better
understood as a constraint on the ability of correlations to enhance the information content
of communication in a distributed task” (ibid., emphasis in original). Bub reformulates the
principle as follows:
Correlations are informationally neutral: insofar as they can be exploited to
allow Bob to distribute information communicated by Alice among the bits in
an unknown data set held by Alice in such a way as to increase Bob’s ability
to correctly guess an arbitrary bit in the data set, they cannot increase Bob’s
information about the data set by more than the number of bits communicated
by Alice to Bob (ibid.).
Stated in this way the principle sounds plausible and seems, intuitively, to be correct.
However if the principle is to be of aid in ruling out classes of physical theory then it should
be more than just intuitively plausible. If the goal of answering the question ‘Why the
Tsirelson bound?’ is to give a convincing reason why correlations that are above the bound
should be regarded as impossible, then if the fact that such correlations violate informa-
tional neutrality is to be one’s answer, one should give an independent motivation for why
correlations must be informationally neutral. One might, for instance, motivate informa-
tion neutrality by showing how it generalises or gives expression in some sense to a deeper
underlying principle that is already well-motivated, or by pointing to ‘undesirable conse-
quences’ of its failure. The consequence of a ‘free computational lunch’ given the existence
of correlations above the bound, if it could be demonstrated, could (perhaps) constitute an
example of the latter kind of motivation.
This said, there is a different way to think of the question ‘Why the Tsirelson bound?’
for which Bub’s explication of information causality in terms of informational neutrality is
both a full answer and indeed an illuminating and useful one. In this sense the question
represents a desire to understand what the Tsirelson bound expresses about correlations
which violate it. Information neutrality answers this question by directing attention to a
feature that no correlations above the bound can have. This feature, moreover, is one that
we can easily grasp and explicitly connect operationally with our experience of correlated
physical systems. On such a reading of the question, to answer ‘information neutrality’ is
not of course to rule out that the world could contain non-informationally-neutral physical
correlations. But on this view ruling out such a possibility is not the point, which is rather
to provide a physically meaningful principle to help us to understand what our current
physical theories, assuming they are to be believed, are telling us about the structure of the
world.
In the remainder of this paper, however, I will continue to consider the information
causality/neutrality principle as a possible answer in the first sense to the question ‘Why
the Tsirelson bound?’. I will continue to consider, that is, whether there is some independent
way of motivating the conclusion that correlations which violate the condition should be
ruled out.
5 The ‘being-thus’ of spatially distant things
Our goal is to determine whether there is some sense in which we can motivate the idea
that information causality must be satisfied by all physical theories which treat of corre-
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lated systems. I will now argue that some insight into this question can be gained if we
consider the analogous question regarding no-signalling. As I mentioned earlier, the no-
signalling condition (2.2) is not a relativistic constraint per se—in itself it is merely a re-
striction on the marginal probabilities associated with experiments on the subsystems of
combined systems—but its violation entails the ability to instantaneously signal, which is
in tension if not in outright violation of the constraints imposed by relativistic theory.16
Indeed, the independently confirmed relativity theory can in this sense be thought of as
an external motivation for thinking of the no-signalling principle as a constraint on the
marginal probabilities allowable in any physical theory.
There is an arguably deeper way to motivate no-signalling, however, that can be drawn
from the work of Einstein and which has been expanded upon by Demopoulos.17 In the
course of expressing his dissatisfaction with the ‘orthodox’ interpretation of quantum theory,
Einstein described two foundational ideas—what Demopoulos calls local realism and local
action. Realism in general, for Einstein, is a basic presupposition of any physical theory.
It amounts to the claim that things in the world exist independently of our capability of
knowing them; i.e.
the concepts of physics refer to a real external world, i.e., ideas are posited of
things that claim a ‘real existence’ independent of the perceiving subject (bodies,
fields, etc.), and these ideas are, on the other hand, brought into as secure a
relationship as possible with sense impressions (Einstein 1948, as translated by
Howard 1985, p. 187).
Local realism—alternately: the ‘mutually independent existence’ of spatially distant
things—is the idea that things claim independent existence from one another insofar as
at a given time they are located in different parts of space. Regarding this idea, Einstein
writes:
Without such an assumption of the mutually independent existence (the ‘being
thus’) of spatially distant things, an assumption which originates in everyday
thought, physical thought in the sense familiar to us would not be possible
(ibid.).
In the concrete context of a physical system made up of two correlated subsystems S1
and S2 (such as that described in the thought experiment of Einstein et al. 1935), local
realism requires that
every statement regarding S2 which we are able to make on the basis of a com-
plete measurement on S1 must also hold for the system S2 if, after all, no mea-
surement whatsoever ensued on S1 (Einstein 1948, as translated by Howard
1985, p. 187).
In other words the value of a measurable theoretical parameter of S2 must not depend
on whether a measurement is made on a system S1 that is located in some distant region of
space. (And of course it must also not depend upon the kind of measurement performed on
S1; cf. Howard 1985, p. 186.) Demopoulos notes that local realism as it is applied in such
a context is a condition imposed on the measurable properties of the theory and hence it is
16For a discussion of signalling in the context of special and general relativity see Maudlin (2011, Ch. 4).
17This is done in Demopoulos’s monograph On Theories; see fn. 2.
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a condition that is imposed at a theory’s ‘surface’ or operational level. This is an important
point that I will return to later.
In the same Dialectica article Einstein also formulated a second principle:
For the relative independence of spatially distant things (A and B), this idea is
characteristic: an external influence on A has no immediate effect on B; this is
known as the ‘principle of local action’ ... The complete suspension of this basic
principle would make impossible the idea of the existence of (quasi-) closed
systems and, thereby, the establishment of empirically testable laws in the sense
familiar to us (Einstein 1948, as translated by Howard 1985, p. 188).
The thought expressed in the second part of this statement seems similar to Einstein’s
earlier assertion that ‘physical thought’ would not be possible without the assumption of
local realism. However Demopoulos convincingly argues that the principle of local realism,
though it receives support from the principle of local action, is a conceptually more fun-
damental principle than the latter. For conceivably the principle of local realism—i.e. of
‘mutually independent existence’—could be treated as holding, Demopoulos argues, even
in the absence of local action. Indeed this is so in Newtonian mechanics. For example,
Corollary VI to the laws of motion (Newton, 1999 [1687], p. 423) states that a system of
bodies moving in any way whatsoever with respect to one another will continue to do so
in the presence of equal accelerative forces acting on the system along parallel lines. This
makes it possible to treat the system of Jupiter and its moons, for example, as a quasi-closed
system with respect to the sun. For owing to the sun’s great distance (and relative size),
the actions of the forces exerted by it upon the Jovian system will be approximately equal
and parallel. Corollary VI, moreover, is used by Newton to prove Proposition 3 of Book I
(Newton, 1999 [1687], p. 448), which enables one to distinguish forces that are internal to
a given system from forces that are external to it, and which provides a criterion (i.e. that
the motions of the bodies comprising a system obey the Area Law with respect to its centre
of mass) for determining when the gravitational forces internal to a system have been fully
characterised. Thus despite its violation of local action, Demopoulos argues convincingly
that Einstein would not (or anyway should not) have regarded a theory such as Newto-
nian mechanics as unphysical. It is still a basicmethodological presupposition of Newtonian
mechanics that spatially distant systems have their own individual ‘being thus-ness’, the
description of which is made possible via the theory’s characteristic methodological tool of
successive approximation, in turn made possible by, for example, Corollary VI, Proposition
3, and the notion of quasi-closed system implied by them.18
Einstein’s principle of local realism or mutually independent existence presupposes the
framework of classical physics, which itself presupposes the framework of classical proba-
bility theory. Demopoulos argues, however, that the conceptual novelty of quantum theory
consists in the fact that it is an ‘irreducibly statistical theory’, precisely in the sense that
its probability assignments, unlike those described by classical probability theory, cannot
in general be represented as weighted averages of two-valued measures over the Boolean
algebra of all possible properties of a physical system (see also Pitowsky, 1989, 2006; Dick-
son, 2011). This raises the question of whether one can formulate a generalisation of the
18Demopoulos does not specifically mention either Corollary VI or Proposition 3 in his discussion, but I take
them to be implicit therein. For a detailed analysis of Newton’s method of successive approximations and the
methodological role therein played by Corollary VI and Proposition 3, see Harper (2011). For a discussion of
the same in relation to general relativity, see DiSalle (2006, 2016).
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mutually independent existence condition that is appropriate for an irreducibly statistical
theory such as quantum mechanics.19
Recall that Einstein’s mutually independent existence condition is a condition that is
imposed on the level of the measurable parameters of a theory and hence at its ‘surface’
or operational level. It requires, in particular, that the value of a measurable property of a
system S1 in some region of physical space R1 is independent of what kind of measurement
(or whether any measurement) is performed on some system S2 in a distant region of space
R2, irrespective of whether S1 and S2 have previously interacted.
Demopoulos argues that in the context of an irreducibly statistical theory such as quan-
tum mechanics, it is in fact the no-signalling condition which generalises the mutually
independent existence condition. It does so in the sense that like mutually independent
existence, no-signalling is a surface-level constraint on the local facts associated with a
particular system, requiring that these facts be independent of the local surface-level facts
associated with other spatially distant systems. Unlike the mutually independent existence
condition, however, these local facts refer to the marginal probabilities associated with a
system’s measurable properties rather than with what one might regard as those proper-
ties themselves. Specifically, no-signalling asserts that the marginal probability associated
with a measurement on a system S1 at a given location R1 is independent of what kind
of measurement (or whether any measurement) is performed on some system S2 in a dis-
tant region of space R2.
20 In this way no-signalling allows us to coherently treat systems
in different regions of physical space as if they had mutually independent existences—i.e.
as quasi-closed systems in the sense described above—and thus allows for the possibility
of ‘physical thought’ in a methodological sense and for “the establishment of empirically
testable laws in the sense familiar to us” (Einstein 1948, as translated by Howard 1985,
p. 188). Demopoulos argues that quantum mechanics, even under its orthodox interpreta-
tion, is in this way legitimated by the principle and may be thought of as a local theory of
nonlocal correlations.
6 Mutually independent existence and communication
In the previous section we saw that no-signalling can be regarded as generalising a criterion
for the possibility of ‘physical thought’ originally put forward by Einstein. And we saw that
since quantum mechanics satisfies no-signalling, one may think of that theory, even under
its orthodox interpretation, as in this sense legitimated methodologically by the principle.
As we saw in §§2-4, however, other conceivable physical theories—some of which allow for
stronger-than-quantum correlations—satisfy the no-signalling condition as well. In light of
this, ‘information causality’ (or ‘information neutrality’, in Bub’s terminology) was put for-
ward by Pawłowski et al. (2009) as an additional foundational principle for more narrowly
circumscribing the class of physically sensible theories. But in §4 I argued that the principle
requires further motivation before it can legitimately be seen as playing this role. With our
recent discussion of no-signalling in mind, let us now consider the proposal of Pawłowski
et al. again.
No-signalling asserts that the marginal probabilities associated with Alice’s local mea-
surements on a system SA in a region RA are independent of what kind of measurement (or
19I am not claiming here that Einstein himself would have been inclined to follow this line of reasoning.
20It is worth noting that the parameter independence condition (Shimony 1993) is just the no-signalling
condition extended to include a hypothetical, possibly hidden, set of underlying parameters.
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b0 a2 a3 a2 ⊕ a3 G
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1
Figure 1: A summary of the possible outcomes associated with Bob’s measurement G (his ‘guess’)
in the guessing game of §3, based on Eq. (3.5). If all atomic variables are assumed to be equally
likely to take on a value of 0 or 1, then G is probabilistically independent of Alice’s measurement
setting a2 ⊕ a3, but not of its components a2 and a3, since, for example, p(G = 0|a2 = 0) = 3/4 6=
p(G = 0|a2 = 1), and p(G = 0|a3 = 0) = 3/4 6= p(G = 0|a3 = 1).
whether any measurement) is performed by Bob locally on a system SB in a distant region
RB. Information causality asserts that Bob can gain no more than m bits of information
about Alice’s data set if she sends him only m bits. Pawłowski et al. (2009, p. 1101) remark
that “The standard no-signalling condition is just information causality for m = 0”. Bub
(2012, p. 180) considers this remark to be misleading, but presumably all that Pawłowski
et al. intend is that if Alice and Bob share signalling correlations, then Alice may provide
Bob with information about her data set merely by measuring it, i.e. without actually send-
ing him any bits. The information causality principle disallows this for any value of E, as
does no-signalling.21
On the other hand when (for instance) m = 1, then in the case where they have previ-
ously shared PR-correlated systems (i.e. systems such that E = 1), one might argue that
there arises a subtle sense in which the probabilities of Bob’s measurement outcomes can
be influenced by Alice’s remote measurement settings. Consider the outcome of Bob’s com-
bined measurement G =df c ⊕ BI I I ⊕ BI I , i.e. his ‘guess’ (3.4). From (3.5) it would appear
that Bob’s outcome is in part determined by the setting of Alice’s measurement on system
II, a2 ⊕ a3, since this appears explicitly in the equation. However in this case appearances
are misleading, for the reader can verify that G is probabilistically independent of a2 ⊕ a3
(see figure 1). G is nevertheless probabilistically dependent on both of a2 and a3 consid-
ered individually. So one might say that although the outcome of G is not influenced by
any of Alice’s measurement settings per se, it does seem to be influenced by the particular
way in which those settings have been determined (despite the fact that neither a2 nor a3
are directly used by Alice to determine the value of the bit that she sends to Bob, c). Put a
different way, the constituents of Alice’s measurement setting on system II respectively de-
termine the two possible outcomes of Bob’s guess whenever he performs the measurement
G (for a given b0). Likewise in the case where Bob measures G
′ = c⊕BI I I⊕BI (i.e. his guess
(3.2)); the two possible outcomes of G′ are, respectively, determined by the constituents of
Alice’s measurement settings on system I, a0 and a1 (for a given b0).
Note that since a2 and a3 (respectively: a0 and a1), besides being the constituents of Al-
ice’s measurement settings on II (respectively: I), are also in fact the values of bits in Alice’s
list a, the above considerations resonate with Bub’s remark (quoted above) that Tsirelson-
bound-violating correlations are such that they may themselves include information about
Alice’s data set in the context of a game like that described in §3. These considerations
21That is, for any value of E within the allowed range of: -1≤ E ≤ 1.
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further suggest a sense, pace Bub, in which it could be argued that the name ‘information
causality’ is indeed apt. For the bit of information c that Alice sends to Bob can be thought
of as the ‘enabler’ or ‘cause’, at least in a metaphorical sense, of Bob’s ability to use this
aspect of the correlations to his advantage (cf. Pawłowski & Scarani, 2016, §3.4).22
Thus one can think of information causality as generalising no-signalling (in the context
of the protocol under which information causality is operationally defined) in two ways.
On the one hand information causality generalises no-signalling in the sense alluded to by
Pawłowski et al.; i.e. it reduces to no-signalling for m = 0. On the other hand informa-
tion causality generalises no-signalling in the sense that, like the no-signalling principle, it
expresses a restriction on the accessibility of the remote measurement settings of a distant
party; but this restriction now applies not just to those remote measurement settings them-
selves, but also more generally to the components by which those measurement settings
are determined. Since, as we saw in the previous section, no-signalling is already well-
motivated in the sense that it gives expression within quantum mechanics to an arguably
fundamental assumption that is implicit in physical practice, the very fact that information
causality generalises no-signalling can be taken as a compelling motivation for it.
Such a conclusion would be too quick, however, for it does not follow from the fact
that information causality generalises no-signalling that it continues to give expression to
the condition of mutually independent existence. But it is mutually independent existence
which, as we saw, motivates no-signalling as a constraint on physical theories. Thus we
must still ask whether a violation of information causality would result in a violation of the
mutually independent existence condition in some relevant sense. Arguably this is indeed
the situation one is confronted with in the context of the guessing game described above
when it is played with Tsirelson-bound-violating correlated systems. On the one hand, when
Alice and Bob share maximally super-quantum systems (i.e. PR-systems, for which E = 1),
then after receiving c there is a sense in which Alice’s system can be said to be ‘a part’
of Bob’s system in the context of the game being played. For after receiving c Bob has
immediate access to the value of any single bit of Alice’s that he would like. Alice’s bits may
as well be his own for the purposes of the game. Indeed, from this point of view the fact
that the communication complexity associated with any distributed computational task is
trivial when PR-correlations are used seems natural; for once Alice’s and Bob’s systems are
nonlocally joined in this way there is naturally no need for further communication. On the
other hand, when Tsirelson-bound-violating correlations that are non-maximal are used,
trivial communication complexity has not been shown to result in all cases. But mutually
independent existence is nevertheless violated in the sense that the correlations shared prior
to the beginning of the game, upon being ‘activated’ by Alice’s classical message c to Bob,
contribute information over and above c to the information Bob then gains about Alice’s
data set; they ‘implausibly’ enhance the accessibility of Alice’s data set by nonlocally joining
Alice to Bob, at least to some extent, in the sense just described.
Now it is one thing to claim that information causality gives expression to a generalised
sense of mutually independent existence. It is another, however, to claim that mutually
independent existence should be thought of as necessary in this context. Recall that in the
last section we saw that mutually independent existence (arguably) must be presupposed
if ‘physical thought’ is to be possible—in other words that it is (arguably) a fundamental
presupposition implicit in physical practice as such. And we saw that a form of this principle
holds in the context of Newtonian mechanics, which may be thought of as in that sense a
local theory of nonlocal forces. We also saw that a form of mutually independent existence
22Perhaps, though, a better name would be the ‘no information causality’ principle.
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appropriate for an irreducibly statistical theory—i.e. the no-signalling principle—holds in
the context of quantum mechanics, and that it may thus be thought of analogously as a
local theory of nonlocal correlations. The context of our current investigation is one which
involves considering communicating agents capable of building and manipulating physical
systems—thought of now as resources—for their own particular purposes. Our context,
that is, is the ‘practical’ one associated with quantum computation and information theory,
recently described by Cuffaro (2017, forthcoming-).23 As Cuffaro has argued, this context
of investigation is in fact distinct from the more familiar ‘theoretical’ context that is associ-
ated with traditional foundational investigations of quantum mechanics. A different way of
putting this is that quantum computation and information theory are ‘resource’ or ‘control’
theories similarly to the science of thermodynamics (Myrvold, 2011; Wallace, 2014; Lady-
man, 2018). Thus the question of whether mutually independent existence is necessary
for the practice of quantum information and communication complexity theory is a distinct
question from the question of whether it is necessary for physical practice in the traditional
sense.
Without the presupposition of mutually independent existence—according to which sys-
tems that occupy distinct regions of space are to be regarded as existing independently of
one another—the idea of a (quasi-) closed system that can be subjected to empirical test,
and in this sense ‘physical thought’, would not be possible (or anyway so argued Einstein).
Analogously, one could argue that in the context of a theory of communication—i.e. of
the various resource costs associated with different communicational protocols and their
interrelations—that it is necessary to presuppose that an operational distinction can be
made between the parties involved in a communicational protocol. One might argue, that
is, that it is constitutive of the very idea of communication that it is an activity that takes
place between what can be effectively regarded as two mutually independently existing
entities, and moreover that such a distinction is presupposed when one quantifies the com-
plexity of a particular protocol.24 For without the ability to make such an effective distinc-
tion between the systems belonging to the sender and the receiver of information, it is not
at all obvious how one should begin to quantify the amount of information that is required
to be sent from Alice to Bob in the context of a particular protocol. From this point of view
it is indeed not surprising that communication complexity theory becomes impossible (in
the sense that all communicational problems become trivially solvable) when PR-correlated
systems are available to use.
7 Objections
An objection to this line of thought is the following. Cannot something similar be said in the
context of the information causality game when Alice and Bob share an entangled quantum
system? For arguably (cf. Howard, 1989) Alice and Bob will become likewise inseparable
or ‘nonlocally joined’ in such a scenario. And yet no one imagines the very possibility of
the sciences of quantum information theory and quantum communication complexity to
have been undermined as a result. So why should one believe them to be undermined
by the possibility of sharing systems whose correlations violate the Tsirelson bound? This
objection, however, involves a description of the situation regarding the sharing of an en-
23Similar ideas have been expressed by Pitowsky (1990, 1996, 2002).
24Cf. Hushilevitz & Nisan (1997, p. x). Cf. also Maroney & Timpson’s (2018) emphasis on the initialisation
and readout stages of an information processing task.
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tangled quantum system that is below the surface-level characterisation that is relevant to
our discussion. It therefore does not undermine the considerations of the previous section.
Consider the description of a classical bipartite communication protocol. Both before
and after communication has taken place, such a description may be regarded as decompos-
able into three parts: a sending system, a receiving system, and something communicated
between them. For a quantum protocol the possibility of such a decomposition is in gen-
eral far less obvious as a result of the well-known conceptual intricacies associated with
entangled quantum states. However whether or not Alice and her system, and Bob and his
system, are ‘in reality’ inseparably entangled with one another, it remains the case, both
before (because of quantum mechanics’ satisfaction of the no-signalling condition) and af-
ter the communication of a classical message (because of quantum mechanics’ satisfaction
of the information causality condition), that Alice’s system, Bob’s system, and the message
c may be operationally distinguished from one another in the sense that Bob cannot take
advantage of the underlying connection he has with Alice and her system via the correla-
tions he shares with her to gain information about her data set over and above what has
been provided to him via c. It is true that previously shared quantum correlations enable
one to communicate with greater efficiency than is possible using only previously shared
classical correlations. As (4.3) shows, Bob has a higher probability of guessing correctly in
the information causality game if he and Alice have previously shared quantum as opposed
to classical correlations.25 And the question arises regarding the source of this increased
communicational power. But whatever that source is, it is not the case that it manifests it-
self in nonlocality or nonseparability at the operational level.26 This is in contrast to systems
whose correlations violate the Tsirelson bound.
But the game described by Pawłowski et al. (2009) involves the communication of clas-
sical bits from Alice to Bob. Might not this limitation in Bob’s ability to take advantage
of his underlying connection with Alice be overcome if we allow her to send him qubits
rather than only classical bits? Indeed, it is well known that if Alice sends a qubit to Bob
that is entangled with a qubit that is already in his possession, then Alice and Bob can im-
plement the ‘superdense coding’ protocol (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, §2.3); Alice’s sending
of a single qubit to Bob according to this protocol will allow him to learn two bits’ worth
of classical information.27 Does this not undermine the claim that quantum correlations
contribute nothing over and above whatever message is sent between Alice and Bob to the
information gained by him?
It does not. On the one hand, before the transmission of the qubit(s) from Alice to
Bob, no-signalling implies that Alice and Bob can be considered as operationally separable
despite their sharing an entangled system, as we have seen above. On the other hand, in the
superdense coding protocol, after Alice transmits her message to Bob, all of the correlated
quantum system that was initially shared is now in Bob’s possession. So after transmission
there is no sense in which Bob can take advantage of correlations shared with Alice at that
time. In a sense Alice’s message to Bob ‘just is’ information regarding the correlations that
25This is true in other contexts besides that of the information causality game. See, e.g., Buhrman et al.
(2001); Brukner et al. (2002, 2004).
26Compare this with Buhrman et al. (2001), who writes that entanglement enables one to “circumvent
(rather than simulate) communication” (p. 1831, emphasis in original), and also with Bub (2010)’s discus-
sion of entanglement in the context of quantum computation, which he argues allows a quantum computer
to compute a global property of a function by performing fewer, not more, computations than classical com-
puters.
27In the context of a suitably generalised version of the information causality game, it turns out that a
two-bit information gain per qubit constitutes an upper bound (Pitalúa-García, 2013).
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exist between them at the time at which she sends it.28
As we have seen, when Alice and Bob share PR-correlated systems, they can win a
round with certainty in the m = 1 game for any N by exchanging a single classical bit.
Earlier I also mentioned van Dam’s (2013 [2005]) result to the effect that PR-correlated
systems allow one to perform any distributed computational task with only a trivial amount
of communication. These results are striking. However the reader may nevertheless feel
somewhat unimpressed by them for the following reason: the number of PR-correlated
systems required to implement these protocols, as we have seen, is great. With respect to
the length n of Bob’s bit string b (arguably the most appropriate measure of input size for
the game), implementing the solution described above requires that they share 2n − 1 PR-
systems; i.e. the number of PR-systems required grows exponentially with the input size.
Likewise for van Dam’s protocol.29 A reduction in communication complexity has therefore
been achieved only at the expense of an increase in computational complexity. One might
argue that it is in this sense misleading to consider the complexity of implementing the
protocol with PR-correlated systems to be trivial—that they provide us with a ‘free lunch’.
I will return to this point later. But for now let me say that, arguably, this is not a
relevant consideration in this context. The theories of communication complexity and com-
putational complexity are distinct sub-disciplines of computer science. The goal of commu-
nication complexity is to quantify the amount of communication necessary to implement
various communicational protocols. For this purpose one abstracts away from any consid-
eration of how complicated a computational system must be in other respects (Hushilevitz
& Nisan, 1997). The question addressed in van Dam (2013 [2005]) and in Pawłowski et al.
(2009) and Pawłowski & Scarani (2016) concerns whether the availability of PR-correlated
systems would make communicational, not computational, complexity theory superfluous.
From this point of view any previously prepared PR-correlated systems are viewed as ‘free
resources’ for the purposes of the analysis.
This said, one can imagine that the subsystems of PR-correlated systems employ some
hidden means of communication with one another, and then argue that this must be in-
cluded in the complexity ascribed to the protocol. This would of course constitute a descent
below the empirically verifiable level. In itself this is obviously not objectionable. But it is
hard to see what use this would be to a theory of communicational complexity, which after
all, like computational complexity (Cuffaro, 2018), aims to be a practical science whose
goal is to guide us in making distinctions in practice between real problems related to data
transmission that are of varying levels of difficulty. In this sense appealing to unseen and
unmanipulable communication between the subsystems of PR-systems does not help with
the conclusion that communication complexity theory, at least in an operational sense, be-
comes superfluous if PR-correlated systems are available. The objection addressed in the
previous two paragraphs is nevertheless an important one that I will return to.
Above I have motivated the idea, of Pawłowski et al. (2009, p. 1101), that the kind of
accessibility of remote data that is possible given the existence of correlated systems which
violate the Tsirelson bound is ‘implausible’. I have done so by describing, pace Bub (2012),
the sense in which information causality can be taken to generalise no-signalling. In so
doing I have gestured at a connection between the idea of implausible accessibility and the
28This conclusion is essentially that of Spekkens (2007, p. 032110-20). Fascinatingly, Spekkens also shows
that the superdense coding protocol can be implemented in his toy classical theory.
29Specifically, van Dam’s (2013 [2005]) protocol requires a number of systems that can grow exponentially
with respect to the input size of an instance of the Inner Product problem, after which the solution can be
efficiently converted into a solution to any other distributed computational problem.
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prima facie separate idea that a world in which Tsirelson-bound-violating correlated systems
exist would be ‘too good to be true’ in a communicational complexity-theoretic sense. My
arguments have been mainly conceptual. I have argued, that is, that a kind of conceptual
ambiguity at the operational level between the parties to a communicational protocol may
result if correlations which violate the Tsirelson bound are available to use. As we have seen,
when such stronger-than-quantum correlations are strong enough (i.e. when E >
p
6/3),
this results in the trivial communicational complexity of any distributed computational task.
But trivial communicational complexity does not result, or anyway has not yet been shown
to result, for values of E above the Tsirelson bounded value of 1/
p
2 that are below
p
6/3.
This is despite the fact that the conceptual ambiguity I have described is present to some
extent for all such values of E.
Thus one may wonder whether ‘a little’ ambiguity may be tolerable for practical
purposes—whether, that is, a theory which admits correlations which only ‘weakly’ vio-
late the Tsirelson bound should be admitted within the space of possible physical theories
from the point of view of the information causality principle. The situation could be seen
as analogous to the situation one is faced with in Newtonian Mechanics, in fact, for Corol-
lary VI (which I described in §5) only guarantees that a system in the presence of external
forces can be treated as (quasi-) closed when these forces act exactly equally upon it and
are exactly parallel. Clearly this is not the case for the Jovian system vis-á-vis the sun, for ex-
ample. Corollary VI—and Proposition 3—nevertheless function as methodological tools in
that they allows us to maintain the idea of the mutually independent existence of spatially
distant things as a methodological principle and treat the Jovian system, for the practical
purpose of analysing its internal motions, as unaffected by the forces exerted upon it by the
sun.
There is much work to be done before information causality can be considered as suc-
cessful in ruling out—in the conceptual sense described in the previous two paragraphs—all
theories whose correlations violate the Tsirelson bound. Irrespective of whether this goal
can be achieved, however, this does not necessarily undermine the status of information
causality motivated as a methodological principle in something like the way that I have
done in this paper. In particular, information causality would be especially compelling if
one could draw a relation between the degree of violation of the principle and the degree
of ‘superfluousness’ of the resulting theory of communication complexity with an eye to
distinguishing ‘weak’ violations of the Tsirelson bound from more objectionable violations.
Thus there is much work to do in any case.
I close with the followingmore fundamental objection. Why should nature care whether
beings such as us are able to engage in communication complexity theory? In fact there is no
fundamental reason why nature should care. Analogously, there is no fundamental reason
why nature should care whether beings such as us can do physics. But the goal of empirical
science is not to derive the structure of the world or its constituent entities by way of a priori
or ‘self-evident’ principles. It is rather to make sense of and explain our experience of and in
the world, as well as to enable us to predict and to control aspects of that world for whatever
particular practical purposes we may have. In fact we have a science which is called physics.
And in fact we have a science which we refer to as communication complexity theory. The
principle of mutually independent existence, and analogously the principle of information
causality, may be thought of as answers to the question: ‘how are such facts possible?’ in
the sense that they aim to identify the necessary suppositions implicit in any such theories
and in our practice of them.30
30Cf. Kant (1998 [1781], pp. B20-B21).
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That said, these may not be definitive answers. The necessity of presupposing Einstein’s
mutual independence and local action principles for the purposes of theory testing has been
questioned by Howard (1989). In a similar way, one might argue that it is wrong to think
that the existence of correlated systems which ‘strongly’ violate the Tsirelson bound would
make any science of communication complexity impossible. Rather, one might conclude
instead that the idea of a science of communication complexity that is wholly independent of
computational complexity-theoretic considerations is unachievable. This, one might argue,
is the real lesson to take away from the fact that an exponential number of PR-correlated
systems is required to implement Alice’s and Bob’s solution to their guessing game. Yet
even if this were all that we learned from information causality, it would still represent a
significant advance in our understanding of the structure of our theoretical knowledge—
an understanding of the physically motivated constraints under which two mathematical
theories may be regarded as mutually independent.
8 Summary
Above I have argued that the principle of information causality has not yet been sufficiently
motivated to play the role of a foundational principle of nature, and I have described a way
in which one might begin to provide it with such a motivation. More specifically I described
an argument, due to Demopoulos, to the effect that the no-signalling condition can be
viewed as a generalisation, appropriate to an irreducibly statistical theory, of Einstein’s
principle of mutually independent existence interpreted as a constraint on physical practice.
I then argued that information causality can in turn be motivated as a further generalisation
of no-signalling that is appropriate to a theory of communication. I closed by describing a
number of important obstacles that are required to be overcome if the project of establishing
information causality as a foundational principle is to succeed.
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